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Abstract:  Corporate fraud is costly, involving hundreds of billions of dollars in lost reputational 
and out of pocket costs for stakeholders and hundreds of thousands of job losses for employees, 
suppliers and customers as well as loss of lives. To prevent fraud, general counsels (GCs) are 
charged as the gatekeepers for the corporation.  They understand the law and they are expected 
to use their legal expertise to advise, intervene and report whenever they are suspicious of fraud.  
In spite of their legally-mandated central role, however, corporate counsels typically do not 
appear to discover any corporate wrongdoing.  In this paper, we analyze the potential reasons 
why corporate counsels keep silent in the face of potential wrongdoing in their own firms and 
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Corporate fraud is costly. It involves loss of hundreds of billions of dollars in reputational and 
out-of-pocket costs for corporations, shareholders, bondholders, and other stakeholders, and 
hundreds of thousands of job for employees, suppliers, and customers.1 In some cases, it has also 
resulted in loss of lives and environmental disasters.2  After more than ten years from the passage 
of Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 (SOX),3 designed to make the corporations more transparent, more 
accountable and less likely to engage in corporate fraud, large-scale corporate scandals show no 
sign of abating.4  Recent high level, post-SOX additions to corporate scandals include GM ignition 
failure, Volkswagen emissions fraud, BP Deepwater accident, LIBOR rate-rigging by large banks, 
options backdating scandals involving more than 100 companies, and FX fixing scandals by some 
large banks, just to name a few.5  Many of these scandals already have, or are expected to, result 
in multi-billion dollar settlements.6  What all of these scandals have in common is the failure of 
the top in-house corporate attorney, or the corporate general counsel, in discovering the 
institutional dysfunction, fraud and cover-ups, and thus either prevent the corporation from sliding 
into fraud and criminal wrongdoing or simply report it before it got bigger.  Why didn’t the top 
corporate attorneys in these and other cases stop the fraud or blow the whistle on these frauds, 
cover-ups and illegal activity? This is the key question we try to address in this article. 
SOX was the federal government’s response to growing corporate fraud around the turn of the 
century, involving Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Arthur Andersen, Adelphia, Global Crossing, and 
others.  These cases convinced the lawmakers that the institutional arrangements for detecting and 
                                                          
1 Dyke, Morse and Zingales estimate that in the 1996-2004 period, one of out seven large publicly traded company 
was engaged in fraud, while the average cost of fraud was set at $380 billion a year.  See Alexander Dyck, Adair 
Morse & Luigi Zingales, How Pervasive is Corporate Fraud, 2014 working paper.   
2  GM ignition scandal has been linked to loss of 124 lives.  http://www.wsj.com/articles/michigan-won-t-discipline-
lawyers-in-gm-ignition-case-1459080002.  
3 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended mainly in scattered sections 
of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.). 
4 See, http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21635978-some-13-years-after-enron-auditors-still-cant-stop-
managers-cooking-books-time-some.       
5 For GM ingition failure scandal, see, http://www.lieffcabraser.com/Personal-Injury/Car-Accidents/GM-ignition-
defect-recall.shtml.  Some victims also sues GM’s top lawyers, see http://www.wsj.com/articles/michigan-won-t-
discipline-lawyers-in-gm-ignition-case-1459080002.  For VW scandal, see http://www.bbc.com/news/business-
34324772; for BP Deepwater scandal see http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/deepwater-horizon-oil-spill, for 
LIBOR scandal, http://www.cfr.org/united-kingdom/understanding-libor-scandal/p28729, and for FX fixing scandal, 
see http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26526905. 
6 See http://abcnews.go.com/Business/high-profile-financial-scandals-months/story?id=17023140.   
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2804352 
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preventing corporate fraud were inadequate and required strengthening. Consequently, SOX was 
passed quickly to enhance reporting requirements, strengthen independence of the board of 
directors, and increase civil and criminal sanctions for violations.7   
SOX also designated corporate attorneys as a special gatekeeper.  SOX imposed requirements 
on corporate attorneys to report any violation to the chief legal officer or chief executive officer 
and if the response from these officers is inadequate, then to the board of directors to stop any 
potential wrongdoing.8  More than any other executives in the corporation, corporate attorneys are 
well-versed in law and they are expected to understand violations of law and they are expected to 
use their legal expertise to advise, intervene and stop wrongdoing.   
In spite of these reforms enacted in SOX and explicit provisions and responsibilities given to 
corporate attorneys, most of the whistle-blowing in case of corporate fraud comes from employees 
(17%), non-financial market regulators (13%), and media (13%).9  Clearly absent from this list are 
top in-house corporate counsels (GCs).  In this paper, we investigate the potential reasons for the 
failure of corporate counsels to report and prevent corporate crime.   
We formulate two mutually exclusive hypotheses to characterize GC’s actions.  The first 
hypothesis is that fraudulent top-level executives intentionally keep the corporate counsel out of 
the information loop.10  As a result, in-house lawyers are generally unaware of the developing 
violations and therefore unable to report and prevent fraud.11  Thus, the corporate counsels cannot 
                                                          
7 See https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/090903tswhd.htm.   
8 15 U.S.C. § 7245; 17 C.F.R. Part 205 (Securities and Exchange Commission’s Standards of Professional Conduct 
for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer). Rule 17 C.F.R. 
§ 205.3 states:  
If an attorney, appearing and practicing before the Commission in the representation of an issuer, 
becomes aware of evidence of a material violation by the issuer or by any officer, director, 
employee, or agent of the issuer, the attorney shall report such evidence to the issuer's chief legal 
officer (or the equivalent thereof) or to both the issuer's chief legal officer and its chief executive 
officer (or the equivalents thereof) forthwith.  
17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1). 
9 Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle of Corporate Fraud?,65 J. FIN. 2213, 2226 
(2010). 
10 As a case in point, according to the Examiner’s Report, WorldCom CEO Bernard Ebbers simply lied to the 
general counsel Michael Salsbury that the board approved Intermedia merger agreement when in fact the board had 
not approved it. See Third and Final Report of Dick Thornburgh, Bankruptcy Court Examiner at 399,In re 
WorldCom, Inc. et al., 377 B.R. 77 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2007). .  
11 WorldCom attorneys Michael Salsbury and Bruce Borghardt appear to fall in this category.Id. at 278 (“The legal 
function at WorldCom was decentralized, with no in-house counsel, including former General Counsel Michael 
Salsbury and Bruce Borghardt, former General Counsel for Corporate Development, charged with responsibility to 
ensure that proper corporate governance processes were followed. The Examiner concludes that an institutional and 
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fulfil their gatekeeping role since they simply do not have the information about the potential 
wrongdoings.    
A second hypothesis is that in-house corporate counsels participate in planning, creation, 
execution or cover-up of the fraud alongside other top management.  This hypothesis states that 
corporate counsels are typically not only present at the scene of the crime, but also they help create 
the crime and thus they are well aware of the crime and subsequent cover-up.   In this case, 
corporate lawyers would have no incentive to report the fraud since they would be turning 
themselves in by reporting.12  
A third in-between possibility is that some corporate lawyers do become marginally aware of 
the violations but they either have incomplete information or they worry about retaliation in case 
they report the violation, and thus they prefer to keep silent or do not escalate their suspicions.13  
Since this category places the corporate lawyers  outside the fraudulent group, we combine them 
with the first group since they do not have sufficient information about the true extent of the 
corporate wrongdoing. 
 Each of these potential explanations  have different implications for corporate governance 
and potential remedies to address corporate fraud.  If the first hypothesis (exclusion) is true, then 
potential remedies might include providing greater access to top-level corporate decision-making 
authority to the GC.  This can include automatic mandated membership in the top decision-making 
executive committees of the corporation in addition to membership on the board of directors, and 
GC’s written approval for financial statements as well as other major corporate initiatives.  If the 
second hypothesis (instigators and/or aid-and-abettors) is true, then whistle-blowing protections 
for GCs might be strengthened to encourage GCs not to be tempted into fraud in the first place.  
                                                          
organizational defect, rather than failings by particular individuals, contributed to the Company’s injuries in this 
area.”). 
12 Corporate Counsels can also take part in illegal activity independently of top management.  On February 5,2016, 
Herbert Sudfelt, an attorney for Fox-Rothchild was convicted of insider trading after he purchased Harleysville 
stock prior to a merger announcement and made approximately $79,000 in illegal profits. 
 
13 Enron attorneys Stuart Zisman and Jordan Mintz appear to fall in this category.  While both attorneys wrote 
memos warning that some large transactions appeared as balance sheet manipulations, their warnings were ignored.  
Neither attorney chose to escalate their suspicions to the board of directors.  See, Lisa H. Nicholson, SarbOx 307's 
Impact on Subordinate In-House Counsel: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 2004 MİCH. ST. L. REV. 559, 601-03 




This might include an explicit Securities Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Rule stating that 
corporate counsel are covered by the whistle-blowing protections that are available to other 
employees.14  Additional regulatory responses might include removing the exemption granted to 
corporate counsels by the PSLRA of 199515 and allowing private right of action for noncompliance 
of SOX provisions against general counsels.   
We test these hypotheses by examining insider trading by top level executives as well as 
general counsels before, during, and after the class period in firms involved in securities class 
action (SCA) settlements.  We also compare insider trading in firms with SCA settlements with 
those firms that were not involved in SCAs.  If GCs are uninformed about violation until the 
whistle blowers reveal the fraud, then we would not expect GCs to be heavy sellers of their own 
firms’ stocks during the class period, as compared to the control periods before and after the class 
periods.   Similarly, if the GCs are outside the fraudulent group and they are only marginally aware 
of some of the violations, they are not likely to know the full extent of the fraud.  In addition, they 
may be afraid to report it due to fear of retaliation.  In this case, we would again not expect the 
GCs to sell their own firms’ stock.  Finally, if the second hypothesis is correct and GCs are part of 
the fraudulent group, we would expect them to behave similarly to the other top level executives 
and sell their own firm’s stock before the fraud is revealed, and thus benefit from the fraudulent 
cover-ups. 
Our evidence shows that GCs generally behave similar to other top-level executives.  They 
are heavy sellers of their own firm’s stocks during the class periods and they profit abnormally by 
avoiding the stock price declines upon revelation of the fraud at the end of the class periods.  Our 
evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the GCs are part of the fraudulent group and 
therefore they should be treated the same.  We suggest that policy responses to corporate fraud 
should include additional penalties for GCs including potential disbarment and allowing for private 
right of action for fraud against general counsels.  A second policy response can include mandated 
hiring of outside legal-audit firms similar to financial audit firms. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the related literature 
on the role of corporate lawyers, corporate fraud identification and revelation.  Section 3 contains 
information about our data and methodology.  Empirical results are discussed in Section 4.  Our 
                                                          
14 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. 
15 Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. 
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policy recommendations to reduce corporate wrongdoing are in Section 5.  Finally, Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
A. Corporate counsels as gatekeepers 
  
Corporate attorneys perform multiple functions for their clients.  The traditional role of an 
attorney is that of  an advocate who is main duty is vigorous representation of the client.16  In 
addition to this function, corporate attorney performs as a transaction engineer, namely that of 
planning, designing and negotiation of particular transactions for their corporate clients.  In this 
role, corporate lawyers act as planners, educators, legal advisors,  investigators, and representatives 
of the client firm. 17   In fact, every legal document corporation prepares is drawn up by a lawyer.18 
Corporate attorney’s third function is that of a verification specialist, namely that of drafting and 
verifying the completeness and accuracy of disclosure documents, in conjunction with new 
security issues and mergers and acquisitions.  This third function is also referred to as the due-
diligence function. 19  
While performing these functions, corporate attorneys also interact with general public, 
investors, and the regulatory system.  Moreover, their decisions affect not only their own clients, 
but also their clients’ employees, suppliers, and customers, investors in firm’s securities, taxpayers 
and thus society at large.  As a result of the wide-ranging implications of attorney’s work, it has 
been held by some that the attorneys also owe a duty to “do justice” society as well.20  Thus, the 
attorneys’ role as gatekeepers refers to their responsibilities to society.   
                                                          
16 See  JOHN C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2006), at 192, ABA 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC7-1 (1983). 
17 See  JOHN C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2006) at 192, Sarah Selene 
Duggin, The Pivotal Role of the Corporate General Counsel in Promoting Corporate Integrity and Professional 
Responsibility,  51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 989,1002-12 (2007); and Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, 
and Entrepreneurs: Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 L. & SOC. REV. 457, 463-66 
(2007). 
18Senator Enzi stated that “in almost every transaction there was a lawyer who drew up the documents involved in 
that procedure.” See  148 Cong. Rec. S6554 (daily ed. July 10, 2002). 
19 Supra note 16. 




The idea that attorneys owe an ethical obligation to society at large to “do justice” goes back 
to American Bar Association’s (ABA) Canons of Ethics in early Twentieth Century.21  While 
stated as an ideal, this responsibility to society-at-large clearly conflicts with attorney’s obligation 
as an advocate for their clients.  While ABA has resisted a gatekeeping responsibility for attorneys 
or corporate counsel, over time, as a result of the numerous financial scandals involving attorney 
misconduct, the gatekeeping function of the corporate counsel was gradually institutionalized  and 
tightened over time.  Finally, Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002  legally mandated the most strict 
gatekeeping requirements for corporate counsels.  
 
B. SOX and gatekeeper corporate counsels  
 
Section 307 of SOX directed the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to adopt “minimum 
standards of professional conduct for attorneys.”22 Section 307 expands the coverage to outside 
and in-house attorneys and defines an “up-the-corporate ladder” reporting if the in-house attorney 
finds material violation of laws within the company.23 What constitutes “material violation” is 
defined vaguely in the law, thus creating ambiguity and subjectivity. The Act defines evidence of 
material violation as “credible evidence, based upon which it would be unreasonable, under the 
circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely 
that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.”24 When an attorney 
suspects material evidence of violation, she shall report the violation to chief legal officer or chief 
executive officer. If she does not get appropriate response in a reasonable time, she goes up the 
ladder to the audit committee. If the audit committee does not give appropriate response in a 
reasonable time, the next step is the qualified legal compliance committee (QLCC). QLCC is the 
highest step to report a fraud or crime within a company.25  
                                                          
21 ABA’s 1908 Canon 30 stated that a “lawyer’s appearance in Court should be deemed equivalent to an assertion on 
his honor tha in his opnion his client’s case is one proper for judicial determination.” See  JOHN C. COFFEE, 
GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2006), at 200. 
22 15 U.S.C. § 7245. See 17 C.F.R. Part 205 – Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and 
Practicing Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer. 
23 18 U.C.S. § 7245(1), (2). 
24 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e).  
25 17 C.F.R. § 205.5(c),(d). If the lawyer cannot get appropriate response from the QLCC, she has to quit her job and 
explain the reasons of quitting to the SEC. This process is called “noisy withdrawal provision.” This is the last resort 
for a lawyer. Noisy withdrawal is enabled by Section 307 of SOX (15 U.S.C. § 7245); however, it has never been 
put into effect by the SEC.  
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Section 806 of SOX provides legal protection against discharge or other discrimination for 
whistle-blowing employees.26  The law also allows the whistleblowers to file a complaint with the 
Secretary of Labor or with the appropriate district court. 27   What is not so clear, however, is 
whether protections of Section 806 extend to general counsels.  The issue is whether general 
counsels are considered employees for the purpose of Section 806 or they are considered  part of 
the management team.  This issue has not been clarified so far.28 
Consequently, SOX added to this structure of formal duties of general counsels a new, fourth 
responsibility as whistle-blowers. The new rules require general counsels to investigate any 
reported potential violation and inform the top management so that they  can take the necessary 
steps to stop the violation, or escalate the reporting to a compliance committee, audit committee, 
or board of directors of the corporation.29   What SOX did not do is to address how this fourth duty 
interacts with the three traditional roles and responsibilities of corporate attorneys. 
While SOX is explicit about whistle-blowing (reporting) requirements for corporate 
attorneys,30 it is pretty much silent on the potential effect of whistle-blower responsibilities on 
their strong advocacy responsibilities.  Gate-keeping requires monitoring company activities to 
discover and prevent misconduct before it happens.31  Gate-keeping responsibilities include 
advising, advocating, and educating all corporate officers of potential legal consequences of their 
                                                          
26 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. 
27 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (b). 
28 Kim T. Vu, Conscripting Attorneys to Battle Corporate Fraud without Shields or Armor? Reconsidering 
Retaliatory Discharge in Light of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MİCH. L. REV. 209, 212-13 (2006). 
29 Rule 205.3(2) states: “ 
 
The chief legal officer (or the equivalent thereof) shall cause such inquiry into the evidence of a 
material violation as he or she reasonably believes is appropriate to determine whether the material 
violation described in the report has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur. If the chief legal officer 
(or the equivalent thereof) determines no material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to 
occur, he or she shall notify the reporting attorney and advise the reporting attorney of the basis for 
such determination. Unless the chief legal officer (or the equivalent thereof) reasonably believes that 
no material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur, he or she shall take all reasonable 
steps to cause the issuer to adopt an appropriate response, and shall advise the reporting attorney 
thereof. In lieu of causing an inquiry under this paragraph (b), a chief legal officer (or the equivalent 
thereof) may refer a report of evidence of a material violation to a qualified legal compliance 
committee under paragraph (c)(2) of this section if the issuer has duly established a qualified legal 
compliance committee prior to the report of evidence of a material violation.   
17 C.F.R. 205.3(2). 
30 See 15 U.S.C. § 7245. 
31 Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93Yale L.J. 886 (1984).  
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actions.32  Clearly, it is difficult for the same person who is required to be a whistle-blower (a 
confrontational role) to advise, inform, and represent (an advocacy role) at the same time.33   
SOX also does not address the potential conflict between other duties of the attorneys in their 
management roles. Conceptually, it is difficult for general counsels who are now part of the top 
management team to monitor and report on top managements’ wrongdoings.34  The more GCs act 
like top management, the less they will be able to engage as gate-keepers, let alone the whistle-
blowers.   
Overall, given that they have multiple potentially conflicting objectives (gatekeepers, 
advocates, transaction engineers, entrepreneurial and managerial responsibilities, and due-
diligence providers), it is not clear how the general counsels will perform as gatekeepers and 
whistleblowers.  Conceptual arguments suggest that the duty that will suffer the most should be 
the gatekeeper and whistle-blower function.35  Nevertheless, this is an empirical issue and subject 
of the tests that follow. 
 
C. In-house counsel versus  outside corporate counsel and fragmentation of legal advice 
 
Over the past several decades, corporations have hired increasing number of lawyers, using 
both outside law firms as well as in-house lawyers, with increasing compensation, status, and 
responsibilities for all attorneys.  Initially, corporations typically had a single legal firm responsible 
for all of their legal work.  Over time, with competition, this role got fragmented between the in-
house attorneys and outside counsel.  Evidence strongly supports the idea that the  in-house 
attorneys have done an effective job of taking care of routine tasks while outside counsel was relied 
                                                          
32 Tanina Rostani, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary Findings and New Research Questions, 2 
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 465, at 466, 467, (2008); Developments in the Law: Corporations and Societ,.. 117 HARV. L. 
REV.  2169, 2248(2004); Henning, supra note 35, at 360; Duggin, supra note 31, at 1003-1020.  
33 Developments in the Law: Corporations and Societ,.. 117 HARV. L. REV.  2169, 2248(2004); Henning, supra note 
35, at 352, 356; Duggin, supra note 31, at 1030.   
34Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, (2005); Deborah A. DeMott, 
The Stages of Scandal and the Roles of General Counsel, 2012 WISC. L. REV. 463, 491 (2012); Duggin, supra note 
31, at 993, 1040-41 ; Thomas G. Bost, Corporate Lawyers after the Big Quake: The Conceptual Fault Line in the 
Professional Duty of Confidentiality, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL  ETHICS1089, 1092-93 (2006). 
35 Duggin, supra note 31, at 1030.  
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upon for specialized skills.  This separation resulted in increasing quality of financial reporting, 
earnings forecasts, legal astuteness, and tax avoidance.36    
Another accompanying change put the in-house counsel in a unique position of representing 
the firm, becoming part of the management team and thus becoming the main channel of 
interaction with outside counsel.  As in-house counsels increased in number, the role of the chief-
legal officer, the General Counsel (GC) also changed over the past several decades. GCs 
increasingly became members of the board and they became responsible for basic routine 
regulatory compliance, risk management, and corporate ethics.37 At the same time, the managerial 
influence and responsibilities of the general counsel increased.  Top management also came to rely 
on in-house legal team for legal strategy rather than external law firms.  In-house lawyers headed 
by GCs now deal with a range of issues, including legal strategy, breaches of anti-trust laws, 
breaches of directors’ and officers’ duties, insider trading, fraud, and stock market disclosures.38  
GCs are also involved in formulating and applying corporate governance principles.39  
In addition, SOX further contributed to the change in the position of in-house counsels, since 
it mandated changes the structure of publicly-traded companies’ boards.40  As a result, directors’ 
legal responsibilities and financial risks increased, thereby increasing the demand for directors and 
directors with legal experience.41  Consequently, post-SOX directors are more likely to be 
                                                          
36 See, e.g., Justin J. Hopkins et al., Corporate General Counsel and Financial Reporting Quality. 61 MGMT. SCI. 129, 
140 (2015); Byungjin Kwak et al.,  The Composition of Top Management with General Counsel and Voluntary 
Information Disclosure, 54 J. ACCT. & ECON. 19, 39 (2012); Jayanthi Krishnan et al., Legal Expertise on Corporate 
Audit Committees and Financial Reporting Quality, 86 ACCT. REV. 2099, 2126 (2011); Constance E. Bagley, Winning 
Legally: The Value of Legal Astuteness, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 378, 386-87 (2008);  Beng Wee Goh et al., The 
Inclusion of General Counsel in Top Management and Tax Avoidance 34-35 (July 8, 2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2538292; Lubomir P. Litov et al., Lawyers and Fools: Lawyer-
Directors in Public Corporations, 102 GEO. L.J. 413, 472, 473 (2014); BEYOND THE LAW, KPMG’S GLOBAL STUDY 
OF HOW GENERAL COUNSEL ARE TURNING RISK TO ADVANTAGE 25 (2012), available at 
https://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/general-counsel-survey-O-
201212.pdf; Adair Morse et al., Executive Lawyers: Gatekeepers or Totems of Governance? 25-26 (Sept. 2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2446611.  
37 Duggin, supra note 31, at 1001- 1023. 
38 DELOITTE GLOBAL CORPORATE COUNSEL REPORT  HOW THE GAME IS CHANGING? 2 (2011), 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.deloitte.com/ContentPages/2513816748.pdf.. 
39 Duggin, supra note 31, at 1026, 1038. 




content/publications/publication210_0.pdf?sfvrsn=2.   
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attorneys or consultants.42 The increasing number of in-house attorneys on board also meant that 
boards were more self-sufficient regarding legal issues and they relied less on external law firms.43   
Outside counsel was hired by the GCs for their specialized skills for a specific transaction.  
This transaction engineering function means that while the outside counsel is more specialized and 
more independent to render unbiased advice, it also meant that they were typically outside the 
firm, they had less information about the client and could not render holistic advice.  Thus, the 
separation of in-house and outside counsel roles also accompanied a fragmentation of legal advice 
along with a reduced ability to monitor and provide guidance. 
Literature suggests that, given these potential conflicts and road-blocks, some attorneys see 
their role as implementers or transaction engineers, narrowly focused on a single issue, rather than 
as broadly-gauged corporate counselors or advisors.”44 Second, in-house attorneys may be 
reluctant to constrain managers because they want to be perceived as a part of the management, 
rather than as an obstacle in front of the management.45 It is also difficult for in-house lawyers to 
separate company objectives from legal objectives.46 Therefore, they are likely to limit their 
gatekeeping functions and defer to management’s judgements about legal risk.47  
Another development also points in the direction of fragmentation.  Surveys indicate that only 
about 60% of the GCs directly report to the CEO.48  This means in about 40% of the firms, the 
CEOs do not have access to legal advice from their chief legal officer.  Inability to directly access 
the CEO also means that GCs will not be informed about the entire enterprise.  This fragmentation 
could be an important factor in GCs being left out of the information loop for them to suspect any 
material wrongdoing is underway.  Overall,  there is a lot of evidence that in-house counsels have 
created value for the shareholders. There is less agreement as to whether in-house counsels have 
reduced corporate crime.49    
                                                          
42 James S.Linck et al., The Effects of Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Supply and Demand 
for Directors, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3287, (2009).  
43 Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes- Oxley Act: A Morality Tale 
for the Policy Makers too. Harvard Law School Discussion Paper, No: 525 (2005), p.18.    
44 Thomas G. Bost, supra note 55, at 1092. 
45 Nelson and Nielson, supra Note 31; Duggin, supra note 31, at 1022..  
46 Nelson and Nielson, supra note 31.  
47 Nelson and Nielson, supra note 31.  
48 See  JOHN C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2006). 
49 Adair Morse et al., , supra note 34, at 15; Peter J. Henning,  Sarbanes- Oxley Act . § 307 and Corporate Counsel: 
Who Better to Prevent Corporate Crime? 8(1) Buffalo Criminal Law Review, (April  2004) explains why lawyers 
cannot reduce corporate crime. Ribstein, supra note 23, also argues that SOX cannot stop corporate crime.   
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D.  Control mechanisms to deter and detect corporate fraud 
 
The finance literature presents three different perspectives on control mechanisms that should 
deter or detect corporate fraud.50 The first perspective is the legal-control mechanism, which states 
that corporate fraud should be investigated and detected by traditional gatekeepers that are  
mandated to do so, such as corporate lawyers, auditors, and securities regulators (represented in 
the United States by the SEC).  Another perspective is the private-litigation mechanism. This 
perspective states that private parties injured by the fraud should monitor the corporations for 
fraudulent activity.51 The last perspective of monitoring is the financial-risk mechanism. This view 
suggests all stakeholders of a company, such as stockholders, bondholders, anaysts, and banks, 
should monitor the company; however the final and responsible monitor should be shareholders 
since they are the residual claimants.52 
Previous research provides limited support for legal and private-litigation views.53  Market 
regulators, auditors, and private litigation lawyers are more successful in detection of fraud relative 
to shareholders.54 Non-financial market regulators are at 13%, media at 13%, SEC at less than 7% 
and law firms only at 3% of the detected fraud cases.  In contrast, the largest group is employees, 
accounting for 17% of the whistle-blowing cases.   Internal governance mechanism covers less 
than 30% of all whistle blowing cases, while  external whistle blowing come mostly from non-
financial industry agents. 55 Among external whistle blowers, private litigation appears to be more 
successful in detecting fraud than public litigation sources.56 
Evidence on the types of whistle-blowers indicates that costs of accessing to private 
information, career-building opportunities and monetary awards are major determinants of whistle 
blowing.57 Anybody blowing the whistle on a large scale fraud can win significant monetary 
awards.  The sucess of employees appear to be due to low costs of accessing information to 
                                                          
50 Dyck et al (2010), Supra note 7, at  2227. 
51 John C. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private 
Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV.  669, 669-70(1986); Rafael La Porta, 
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Schleifer, What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FİN. 1, 5-6, 1-32 (2006). 
52 Eugene F. Fama, Contract Costs and Financing Decisions, 63 J. BUS. S71, S79, S89 (1990) vol. 63, 1, pp. 71-91.  
53 Dyck et al., supra note 7, at 2230. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 2224, 2226, 2230. 
56 James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, (2003) SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 Duke L.J., 737, 
763 (2003).. 
57 Dyck et al. (2010), supra note 7, at 2231-2248. 
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discover the fraud, since employees can access the necessary private information for fraud 
detection at low or zero cost.58 Journalists have some private information advantages and can enjoy 
great career advancement opportunities after they blow the whistle on important cases. On the 
other hand, auditors not only do not gain from whistle blowing, but they can lose a significant 
portion of their business as a result.  Therefore, they do not have any incentives to blow the 
whistle.59  
SOX implicitly assumes that corporate fraud can be detected and prevented through the 
regulatory channel.  Consequently, SOX is designed to increase transparency, accountability and 
sanctions, however it comes at significant compliance costs for public firms.   One view against 
SOX is that compliance costs of SOX exceed its benefits, thereby making society worse off even 
if it leads to greater fraud detection. 60  A second view is that regulatory enforcement is not the 
main channel that controls corporate fraud.  Instead, private actions, shareholder monitoring and 
takeovers are important channels to control corporate fraud.61  However, SOX has not addressed 
strengthening shareholder involvement in fraud detection and prevention.  This idea is due to 
Professor Eugene Fama62 but it is only partly supported by empirical evidence.63   
The evidence on the effect of SOX on fraud reduction is mixed.64  In post-SOX era, auditors 
identified more fraud, analysts identified about the same, while employees detected less fraud than 
in pre-SOX era.65  The decline in whistle-blowing for the most important segment (employees) 
suggests that while SOX is effective in protecting employees from being fired, it is ineffective 
against loss of career adhencement opportunities or even as a shield against harassment.66  This 





                                                          
58 See Friedrich Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 34 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519-20 (1945). 
59 Dyck et al. (2010), supra note 7, at 2215,2232-2235. 
60Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 
2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (2002).    
61 Dyck et al., supra note 7, at 2214, 2227; Larry E. Ribstein, supra note 23, at 2003. 
62 Dyck et al. (2010), supra note 7, at 2214, 2227. 
63 Id. at 2230. 
64Id. at 2249. 
65 Id. at 2249, 2250.    
66 Id. at 2241, 2245.  
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E.  Relation to insider trading literature 
 
Our paper also expands the literature on insider trading.  Previous research has shown that the 
ability of insiders to trade profitably is directly related to the position and responsibility within the 
firm: Top executives typically earn a higher rate of return than officers and directors, who also 
earn a higher rate of return than outside large shareholders.67 Consequently, access to privileged 
information directly arises as a result of day-to-day activities of the top executives. 
In this paper, we analyze the profitability of general counsels not only in the firms with 
Securities Class Actions (SCAs) but in all other firms as well.  Consequently, we can compare the 
profitability of general counsels with other top level executives.  To the extent GCs make similar 
trading profits as the rest of top level executives, we can gauge the level of involvement and 
responsibilities of general counsels within the firm to be similar to other top level executives such 
as CEOs, CFOs, and chairmen of the board.  On the other hand, if we find that, in general, GCs 
make less trading profits than the fellow top executives, this finding would tell us that the level of 
responsibility of GCs would be comparable to other directors or officers. 
Another strand of literature ties the profitability of insider trading to corporate governance and 
internal control mechanisms.68  Comparing the profitability of insider trading in firms with large 
financial settlements to a broad set of control group also allows us to examine the relation between 
the profitability of insider trading in firms with good and deficient control mechanisms and 
corporate governance structures.   
 
 
                                                          
67 See, e.g.,  H. Nejat Seyhun, Insiders’ Profits, Costs of Trading, and Market Efficiency, 16 J. FIN. ECON.  189, 210 
(1986); Arturo Bris, Do Insider Trading Laws Work? 23 (Yale ICF Working Paper No. 00-19, 2010); H. Nejat Seyhun, 
The Information Content of Aggregate Insider Trading, 61 J. BUS. 1,22 (1988); H. Nejat Seyhun, Why Does Aggregate 
Insider Trading Predict Future Stock Returns?, Quarterly J. Econ. 1302, 1329(1992); Bin Ke et al., What Insiders 
Know About Future Earnings and How They Use It: Evidence from Insiders’ Trade,35 J. ACCT. & ECON. 315, 315 
(2003);  John E. Core et al., Stock Market Anomalies: What Can We Learn from Repurchases and Insider Trading? 
25 (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=533323, 2005); Albert S. Kyle, Continuous Auctions and 
Insider Trading, 53 Econometrica   1315, 1315 (1985); H. Nejat Seyhun &  Michael Bradley, Corporate Bankruptcy 
and Insider Trading, 70 J. BUS. 189, 203, 214 (1997). 
68 Hollis A.Skaife et al.,  Internal Control over Financial Reporting and Managerial Rent Extraction: Evidence from 
the Profitability of Insider Trading, 55 J. Acct. &  Econ. 91, 107 (2013); Anup Agrawal & Sahiba Chadha, Corporate 
Governance and Accounting Scandals, 68 J L. & ECON. 371, 403 (2005);  Scott L. Summers & John T. Sweeney, 
Fraudulently Misstated Financial Statements and Insider Trading: An Empirical Analysis, 73 Acct. Rev. 131, 144 
(1998); Enrichetta Ravina &  Paola Sapienza,  What Do Independent Directors Know? Evidence from Their Trading, 
23 REV. FIN. STUD. 962, 1001 (2010). 
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This study analyzes the insider trading activities of top executives, general counsels and other 
officials in the companies listed in Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse 
(SCAC). 69 SCAC keeps track of more than 4,000 class action lawsuits filed in Federal Court since 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 has been enforced.70  
A Securities Class Action (SCA) contains allegations that the company or its managers 
violated at least one federal or state securities law that caused damages for a number of parties. A 
file is called a class action because number of injured parties is so numerous that it is not practical 
to adjudicate each case separately.   Furthermore, commonality of interest is required to call a case 
class action and plaintiffs must demonstrate that the claims of the representatives of class are 
typical of every class member.71  
The analysis period of the study is 1996–2014, containing 4,041 cases filed in the dataset. 
Since law firms automatically file a class action lawsuit if any large negative shock occurs in share 
prices, it is not likely that any large class-action lawsuit would be excluded in this file.72  After 
getting data from SCAC, we applied some filters to get rid of small or frivolous cases. First, we 
eliminated the cases that were dismissed or ongoing. After the first elimination, we had 2054 cases 
in the dataset. Second, we eliminated cases with the settlement amount lower than $25 million. 
We chose a sizable minimum settlement amount in order to ensure that the fraud and estimated 
                                                          
69 Stanford Law School, Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (hereunder as “SCAC”), 
http://securities.stanford.edu/index.html. 
70 Stanford Law School, Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, About Us, http://securities.stanford.edu/about-the-
scac.html#about (last accessed Feb. 25, 2016). 
71 Rules 23(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the requirements for class certification. Rule 
23(a) sets forth four threshold requirements for class certification, each of which must be met: (1) the class is so 
numerous that joinder of class members is impracticable (numerosity); (2) there are questions of law or fact common 
to the class (commonality); (3) the claims or defenses of the class representatives are typical of those of the class 
(typicality); and (4) the class representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class (adequacy). 
Courts have added additional requirements: The courts require (1) that a definable class exists, (2) the named 
representatives are members of that class, and (3) the claim of the class is live, rather than moot. See, 
http://www.federalpracticemanual.org/node/42  
72 Stephen J. Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Securities Litigation Reform Act, 6  J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
35, 46 (2009); Paul A. Griffin et al.,  Stock Price Response to News of Securities Fraud Litigation: Market Efficiency 
and the Slow Diffusion of Costly Information, 2 (Stan. L. Sch. John M. Olin Program in L. & Econ. Working Paper 
No 208, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=251766.   
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damages were sufficiently large and that insiders would take into account the anticipated stock 
price effects.  For these large settlement cases, the median settlement amount represented about 
1.1% of the estimated damages.73  Based on these numbers, the estimated damages for the 
minimum settlement amount are about $2.3 billion.   
Applying the $25 million minimum settlement filter left us with only 169 companies.  Next, 
we eliminated a few companies which are traded privately and did not match with CRSP CUSIP 
number and name.74 Finally, we eliminated companies that had no open market transactions by 
insiders in our insider trading database.  In the end, we have a sample  with 131 companies.  
We collected insider trading data from Thomson Reuters (TFN)75 for the analysis period. The 
dataset contains the volume and amount of sales and purchases of insider trading. The database is 
constituted by the legally-mandated reporting of all insider transactions.76 We use the information 
on insider trading of top executives, general counsels, and other officers. Top executives, directors, 
and other officers, and general counsels are classified using role codes in the TFN database. Top 
executives are limited to officer and director (‘OD’), officer, director, and beneficial owner (‘H’), 
chairman of the board (‘CB’), CEO (‘CEO’), CFO (‘CFO’), controlling person (‘CP’), general 
partner (‘GP’), and president (‘P’). General counsels are coded with ‘GC.’ Directors and other 
officers are defined as all other officers.77  We include any large shareholder with any officer title.  
We exclude outside large shareholders (‘SH’) and outside beneficial owner of more than 10% of 
a class security (‘B’). These outside groups are typically hurt by the corporate fraud and thus they 
not likely to be aware of any ongoing corporate fraud.  
As a next step, we combine SCAC and insider trading information and we are left with the 
insider trading activities of companies which were involved in fraud settlements after Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.78 As control periods, we construct pre-class and post-
class periods that are exactly the same number of days as the class period.  Hence, if the class 
                                                          
73 See, http://securities.stanford.edu/research-reports/1996-2013/Settlements-Through-12-2013.pdf, at 9. 
74 CUSIP numbers refer to unique eight digit alphanumeric identification numbers assign to all publicly listed 
securities by the Committee for Uniform Security Identification Procedures.   See, 
https://www.cusip.com/cusip/index.htm 
75 See https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ 
76 15 U.S.C. § 78p, Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Section 16(a). See, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/78p.   
77 http://www.whartonwrds.com/datasets/thomson-reuters-2/   
 
78 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
17 
 
period is 200 days, then the pre-class period is also comprised of 200 days that end one day before 
the beginning of the class period.  Similar, post-class period is also 200 days that start from the 
end of the class period.  We test the timing of insider trading activities for the pre-class period 
before class action starts, during the class action period, and for the post-class period. We also 
compare the results with the insider trading activities of companies which are not involved in 
fraudulent activities.   
Table 1A displays sample characteristics of insider trading in all firms in the CRSP database 
between 1996 and 2014. This table provides information about trades of different insider groups 
in the whole sample. Purchases and sales are reported separately. We also classify companies into 
three categories:  Small-cap firms are the ones with less than $1 billion market capitalization.  Mid-
cap firms are the ones with market capitalization between $1 billion and $5 billion. Large-cap 
firms have higher than $5 billion market capitalization.  
The table shows that the number of firms involved in insider trading and number of trades are 
decreasing with market capitalization, while the average trade size is increasing with market 
capitalization. It is worth considering the differences in number of trades: 894,623 purchases 
versus 2,862,353 sales realized during the analysis period. Hence, sales are about three times more 
frequent than purchases. Ratio of number of shares purchased to number of shares sold is also 
dependent on firm size.  In small-cap firms, this purchase to sale ratio equals 61% (9.7 billion to 
16.0 billion).  In mid-cap firms this ratio falls to about 12% (1.2 billion to 10.1 billion).  In large-
cap firms, purchase to sale ratio falls further to 4.8% ( 465.2 million to 9.6 billion).   
The ratio of purchases to sales follows similar patterns for officers, directors and top 
executives.  However, the pattern of general counsels’ trades is different: The general counsels 
tend to sell about 85 times more shares than they buy (16.5 million purchased versus 1.4 billion 
shares sold).  This pattern indicates that general counsels typically sell  the shares they receive 
from the corporation as incentive compensation.   
Table 1B displays additional sample characteristics of insider trading with firms with 
securities fraud settlement during the same period (1996 through 2014). The total number of firms 
with insider trading in the dataset is 131.  Number of firms and number of trades are increasing 
along with market capitalization of firms. These numbers show that there is more insider trading 
activity in big, SCA-settled firms. The average class period is around 600 calendar days, or a little 
over 1.5 years.  The class period appears to be slightly shorter in smaller firms.   
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Average settlement amount is increasing monotonically with firm size.  This finding indicates 
that larger firms with deeper pockets tend to settle for larger amounts.  In small-cap stocks, the 
average settlement amount is around $60-$90 million.  In large-cap stocks, this amount grows to 
about $280 million, while the average settlement is about $170 million.   
The number of sales is 31,704, which is about ten times as big as the  number of purchases, 
namely 3,012.  Compared to the overall sample, firms with SCA settlements have a greater sale-
purchase ratio, more than 10 as compared to the overall sample, which is about 3 in Panel A.    
Average size for purchases is higher than average size of sales, 50,000 versus 21,000 shares 
in firms with SCA settlements.   Thus, we can say that insiders in SCA companies sell in small 
amounts, while their sales are more frequent than their purchases.  
Using the ratio of settlements to damages, we can also compute an approximate figure for 
stakeholder damages.  Based on these settlement amount, the estimated range of damages caused 
by the alleged fraud is between $6 billion to $30 billion.79  These damage amounts are very large 
and indicate that they are likely to involve substantial stock price effects.   
Table 1A also shows that the total sales exceed total purchases by a factor of seven ( $660 
billion is sales to $90 billion in purchases).  Similar patterns are observed for officers, top 
executives and general counsels, with increasing sales to purchase ratio.  For top executives sales 
to purchase ratio is around nine ($227 billion to $25 billion) and around 30 for general counsel 
($.4.3 billion to $130 million).  Our results indicate that general counsels in SCA-settled firms are 
more aggressive sellers compared to top executives and officers and directors.   
Tables 1B, 1C and 1D compare insider trading for the pre-Class, Class and post-Class periods.  
Overall insider sales increase more than 50% during the Class period as compared to the pre-Class 
Period.  During the pre-Class period, insiders have sold $215 million shares (Table 1B).  During 
the Class Period, insider sales reach over $350 million shares, an increase of 63%.  This increased 
selling is consistent with the hypothesis that insiders are aware of the overvaluation of their 
common stock and they are acting proactively to reduce their potential losses by reducing their 
holdings.  Table 1B and Table 1C show that the increase in sales holds for each insider group.  The 
number of shares sold increased 116% for officers and directors, 13% for top executives and 91% 
for general counsel, respectively.   
                                                          
79 The ratio of settlements to damages is about 1% for large settlements. See, http://securities.stanford.edu/research-
reports/1996-2015/Settlements-Through-12-2015-Review.pdf   
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During the post-Class Period, insider selling declines substantially.  In Table 1D, insider 
selling equals 95 million shares.  This represents a decline of more than 70% from 350 million 
shares sold during the Class period.  Furthermore, selling declines for every insider group.  The 
decline equals 80% for officers and directors (from 219.5 million to 44.3 million), 61% for top 
executives (from 128.7 million to 49.8 million), and 48% for the general counsel (from 2.5 million 
to 1.3 million).   
While not shown here, we also explore insiders’ trading patterns before and after SOX.  We 
find similar purchase and sales patterns both before and after SOX.  For all three insiders groups, 
insiders increase their sales from pre-Class period to Class period, and then reduce their sales 
during the post-Class period.  Hence, our finding indicates that SOX has not changed insider 
trading patterns.   
Overall, the fact that sales first increase substantially from pre-Class period to the Class period 
and then decline substantially during the post-Class Period is consistent with the hypothesis that 
all three groups of insiders are aware of the implications of SCA allegations on their own firms’ 
stock prices.  To reduce their potential losses from overvalued shares, insiders sell during the Class 
period.  During the post-Class Period, stock prices are closer to fundamental values and the need 
to sell shares is reduced.  Next, we analyze the profitability of insider trading patterns during the 
Pre-Class, Class and post-Class Periods.  
 
B. Measuring Insiders’ Abnormal Stock Profits 
 
First, we run a standard event study analysis to determine abnormal returns using our sample 
companies. Event date (day 0) is the insider trading date for each trade. We measure abnormal 
returns, AR around insiders’ trades by computing the market-adjusted daily stock returns.  
 
ARi,t = ( 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑟𝑚,𝑡) 
 
Where ri,t is the return to stock i that insiders have traded for day t, and rm,t is the return to the 
CRSP value-weighted portfolio of all NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ, and ARCA for  day t following 
the insider trading day. Next, we compute insiders’ abnormal profits, AP for each day around the 




APi,t = H* ( 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑟𝑚,𝑡) 
 
To compute insiders’ abnormal profits, we normalize insiders’ trades by multiplying insiders’ 
abnormal returns with one for insiders’ purchases and minus one for insiders’ sales.  Hence, the 
parameter H takes the value 1 for insiders’ purchases and -1 for insiders’ sales.  Abnormal 
profitability is measured relative to market movements.  Thus, following insiders’ purchases, 
insiders are deemed to make an abnormal profit if the stock price increases more than the increase 
in the market return.  If the stock market falls, then to be deemed abnormally profitable, insiders’ 
stock must fall less than the market.  Following insiders’ sales, insiders are deemed to make an 
abnormal profit if the stock price falls more than the fall in market return.  If the stock market rises, 
then to be deemed abnormally profitable, insiders’ stock price must rise less than the market  We 
then cumulate insiders’ abnormal profits around insiders’ transactions over longer-window 
horizons, T. 
 
CAPi,T = ∑ 𝐻 ∗ (𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0 − 𝑟𝑚,𝑡) 
 
 CAPi,T represents cumulative abnormal profits over T days before or following the insider 
trading day, ri,t is the return to stock i for day t, and rm,t is the return to the CRSP value-weighted 
portfolio of all NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ, and ARCA for  day t following the insider trading day. 
We compute cumulative abnormal returns for 10-, 20-, 50-, 100-,  200-, and 250-day holding 
periods in order to follow patterns in return around each insider trading date. For comparison 
purposes we also measure abnormal price movements prior to the insider trading day.   
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
We provide the main results of our paper in this section.  Table 2 displays insiders’ abnormal 
profits computed in non-litigation firms between 1996 and 2014. All three groups of insiders trade 
profitably.  Our database contains over 2 million trades for officers.  Following these transactions, 
officers and directors earn about 4.1% in abnormal returns.  For top executives, our database 
21 
 
contains over one million trades.  Following these trades, top executives earn about 5.6%.  Finally, 
our database contains over 63,000 trades for the general counsels. Following these trades, the 
general counsels earn about 3.6%.  Abnormal returns for all event periods are statistically at about 
the 1% level for officers, top executives, and general counsels. Overall, general counsels’ profits 
are comparable to those of officers and directors. 
Next we turn our attention to SCA-settled firms.  Table 3 displays insiders' abnormal profits 
in firms subject to securities fraud lawsuits between 1996 and 2014 that resulted in settlements.  
We examine insider trading separately before the Class Period, during the Class Period, as well as 
post-Class Period.  The first column shows number of observations in each period. As expected, 
number of insider trading by general counsels is comparably less than that of officers and top 
executives since there is only one general counsel in each firm.  
Examining number of transactions, we see that insider trading is more numerous during the 
Class Period as compared to pre-Class or post-Class periods even though the length of the periods 
are identical.  This finding indicates that for SCA-settled firms, Class-Period represents a period 
of greater information asymmetry and therefore a period that is offering potentially greater 
profitability as compared to pre- or post-Class periods.  While this pattern holds for all three insider 
groups, it is especially true for general counsel, again suggesting that the source of information 
asymmetry has legal connotations.   
We analyze insider profitability next.  The first three lines of Table 3 show the abnormal 
returns from insider trading of officers and directors before, during, and after the class period. Pre-
class period results are not significant for 6,741 insider transactions.   During the Class period, 
officer and directors increase the number of trades to 9,466.  The abnormal profitability of officers 
and directors’ transactions during the Class period reach as high as 29.4% during the 250 days 
after insider trading day.  Further, officer and directors’  transactions display statistically abnormal 
profitability immediately after the insider trading day.  This finding insiders that officers and 
directors do not refrain from trading close to the revelation of the material non-public information.  
During the post-Class Period, officers and directors execute 3,846 transactions.  Profitability of 
officer and directors’ transactions continue in this period, with abnormal profits reaching about 
28.4% after 250 days. 
Top executives’ profitability is shown in the next three rows.  Pre-Class period results are not 
significant for 3,887 transactions by top executives.  During the Class period, top executives 
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increase their number of trades to 6,644.  The abnormal profitability of top executives’ profits 
during the Class period reach as high as 21.9% during the 250 after insider trading day.  Further, 
top executives’ transactions display statistically abnormal profitability immediately after the 
insider trading day.  This finding indicates that top executives also do not refrain from trading 
close to the revelation of the material non-public information.  During the post-Class Period, top 
executives engage in 2,490 transactions.  Profitability of top executives’ transactions continues in 
this period, with abnormal profits reaching about 41.7% after 250 days. Once again, top 
executives’ transactions display statistically abnormal profitability immediately after the insider 
trading day.   
Finally, general counsels’ trading profitability is shown in the last three rows.  Pre-class period 
abnormal returns are negative and significant for 260 transactions by GCs.  Hence, GCs do not 
trade profitably prior to the Class Period.   
During the Class period, GCs increase the number of trades to 1,300, which is a four-fold 
increase from the pre-Class period.  The abnormal profitability of GCs’ profits during the Class 
period reach as 17.7% during the 250 after insider trading day.  However, GCs abnormal profits 
do not attain statistical significance until about 200 days after the insider trading day.  This 
evidence indicates that GCs trade more intensely, based on material nonpublic information as well 
as in advance of the material non-public information.   
During the post-Class Period, GCs engage in only 69 transactions.  Profitability of GCs’ 
transactions occurs early immediately after the insider trading day.  For long horizon windows, the 
abnormal profits are not significant.   
To explore the timing issues in more detail, insiders’ abnormal profits during the pre-Class 
periods, Class periods and post-Class periods for all three groups of insiders are also plotted in 
Figures 1, 2 and 3.  In Figure 1, abnormal profits fall for all three groups prior to the insider trading 
day.  Following the insider trading day, abnormal profits remain flat or continue to fall.  This figure 
indicates that while insiders tend to buy shares after price falls and sell shares after price increases, 
there are no systematic price movements following the insider trading day that would create 
abnormal profits.  Thus, for our sample of SCA-settled firms, the pre-Class period does not seem 




Figure 2 shows the price patterns for the Class Periods for all three groups of insiders.  The 
V-shaped figure around the insider trading day indicates that stock prices rise abnormally prior to 
insiders’ sales and they fall abnormally after insiders’ sales.  Similarly, stock prices fall abnormally 
prior to insiders’ purchases and they rise abnormally following insiders’ purchases. Thus insiders 
buy at low price and they sell at high prices and they avoid the loss associated with the subsequent 
fall in process.   
From Figure 2, for officers and directors, stock prices rise abnormally about 15% prior to the 
sale day and they fall abnormally about 30% after the sale days. For top executives, stock prices 
rise abnormally about 25% prior to the sale day and they fall abnormally about 22% after the sale 
days. Finally for general counsels, stock prices rise abnormally about 40% prior to the sale day 
and they fall abnormally about 18% after the sale days.   These findings indicate that generals 
counsels time their sales to occur soon after the stock prices have peaked. 
Figure 2 also  indicates that for officers and directors as well as top executives, insiders 
transactions become profitable immediately.  In contrast, general counsels’ transactions do not 
attain profitability for about 80 trading days (about four calendar months) after insider trading day.  
This finding indicates that general counsels tend to execute their sales transactions earlier in the 
Class period as compared to the other executives.   
Post-Class period abnormal profits are shown in Figure 3 for all three groups of insiders.  This 
figure is mostly similar to Figure 2.  Insiders are able to time their purchases and sales during the 
post-Class periods to make abnormal profits as well.   
Next, we separate insiders’ transactions into purchases and sales and examine their 
profitability separately.  These results are shown in tables 4A and 4B.  As one can see from these 
tables, the profitability of insider trading during the Class-Period is driven by sales only. Insiders’ 
purchases during the Class Period are not profitable for any of the three insider groups.  Typically, 
insiders purchases do become positive and statistically significant during the pre-Class period for 
officers and post-Class Period for the general counsels.  In contrast, sales are highly profitable both 
during the Class Period for all three groups of insiders.   In addition, insiders’ sales are also 
profitable for officers and top executives during the post-Class Period. 
Next we examine the relation profitability of insider trading and volume of trading.  For 
officers and directors, these relations are shown in tables 5A.   The general finding from the 
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literature is that profitability of insider trading increases with insider trading volume.80  One 
concern here is that insiders might worry about trading larger volumes when they have more 
precise information since these transactions can increase the likelihood that they would be named 
as defendants in a subsequent lawsuit.  Hence whether insiders in SCA-settled firms trade large 
amounts when they have more precise information is an open question. 
Examining tables 5A, we see that profitability of officers and directors transactions in fact do 
not increase monotonically during the Class period.  Officers and directors earn 36.5% when they 
trade less than 1,000 shares, 24.3% when they trade between 1,000 and 10,000 shares, and 27.2% 
when they trade greater than 10,000 shares.  This finding is consistent with risk aversion 
hypothesis. 
The relation between profitability and trading volume for top executives is shown in table 5B.  
For top executives, abnormal profits during the Class period increase monotonically.  Top 
executives earn 16.3% when they trade less than 1,000 shares, 27.1% when they trade between 
1,000 and 10,000 shares, and 35.1% when they trade greater than 10,000 shares. These results 
suggests that top executives do not appear to worry about increased likelihood of being subject to 
a lawsuit. 
Finally, we examine the abnormal profitability for GCs.  The relation between profitability 
and trading volume for GCs is shown in table 5C.  GCs do not earn a statistically significant profit 
when they trade less than 1,000 shares during the Class period.  Their profits rise to 31.3% when 
they trade between 1,000 and 10,000 shares and then level off to 26.3% when they trade more than 
10,000 shares.  However, there are only 28 such observations with more than 10,000 shares traded 
during the Class Period. 
Overall, our evidence indicates that top executives do trade larger volumes when they have 
more precise information during the Class period.  For general counsels profitability generally 
increases with greater trading volumes, however the relation is not monotonic.  Our evidence is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the general counsels do worry about being subject to a greater  
probability of being named a defendant in case of a lawsuit and they hold back trading very 
aggressively. 
                                                          
80 See for instance, H. Nejat Seyhun, Insiders’ Profits, Costs of Trading, and Market Efficiency, 16 J. FIN. ECON.  
189, 210 (1986). 
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Next we analyze the impact if any that SOX may have had on insider trading behavior of 
SCA-settled firms.  These results are shown in tables 6A and 6B.   Our evidence indicates that 
SOX did not affect the profitable trading behavior of insiders during the Class period.  For the pre-
SOX period, all three groups of insiders trade profitably during the Class Period.  Similarly , for 
the post-SOX period, all three groups of insiders continue to trade profitably for the Class Period.  
Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that SOX has been ineffective in controlling 
profitable trading behavior of any group of insiders. 
As a sensitivity test, we also examine profitability of insider trading for smaller settlements.  
For this purpose, we used $3 million to $25 million settlements.  These results are shown in table 
7.  Our evidence in table 7 indicates that even for smaller settlements, insiders continue to trade 
profitably.  Comparing our larger-settlement results in table 3 with smaller settlement results in 
table 7, we observe that for profitability of insider trading actually increases for smaller settlements 
for all three groups of insiders.  One possible explanation for these results is that insiders may be 
viewing the costs of profitable trading to be smaller in smaller settlement cases.  As a consequence,  




5. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Our evidence suggests that the lack of action on the part of the general counsels in stopping 
corporate wrongdoing is not lack of access to top-level information.    Instead, our evidence 
indicates that general counsels act in concert with the other top executives and they are aware of 
the corporate wrongdoing.  To gain greater co-operation from the general counsels’ office, we 
suggest three policy recommendations.   
Our first recommendation is that the whistle-blowing protections for GCs might be 
strengthened to encourage GCs not to be tempted into fraud in the first place and to gain greater 
co-operations from the general counsels to actively stop corporate fraud.  Currently, there is 
ambiguity about whether the general counsels are covered by the whistle blowing protections 
afforded to other employees.  Including the general counsels under this protection will encourage 
more general counsels to step forward and stop corporate wrongdoing before it involves This might 
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include an explicit Securities Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Rule stating that corporate counsel 
are covered by the whistle-blowing protections that are available to other employees.81   
We suggest a second policy response should be to remove the exemption granted to 
corporate counsels by the PSLRA of 199582 and allow private right of action for noncompliance 
of SOX provisions against general counsels.  By allowing private right of action against the GCs, 
the costs of passively watching corporate fraud take hold will be increased.  Consequently, we 
would expect more general counsels to actively stop corporate wrongdoing. 
Finally, our third policy recommendation is for the SEC to ban any general counsel of any  
SCA-settled firm from representing any client in any SEC business.  This blanket ban will ensure 
that even if in some cases, the general counsel was not aware of the fraud, they would be 
encouraged to be more vigilant in seeking out potential wrongdoing.  Consequently, such a ban 






In this article, we investigate the potential reasons for the failure of corporate counsels to 
report and prevent corporate crime.  Since corporate attorneys are well-versed in law and they are 
expected to use their legal expertise to advise, intervene and stop wrongdoing, SOX has designated 
corporate attorneys as a special gatekeeper.  SOX imposed reporting requirements on corporate 
attorneys to report any violation to the chief legal officer or chief executive officer and if the 
response from these officers is inadequate, then to the board of directors to stop any potential 
wrongdoing.83  
                                                          
81 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. 
82 Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. 
 
83 15 U.S.C. § 7245; 17 C.F.R. Part 205 (Securities and Exchange Commission’s Standards of Professional Conduct 
for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer). Rule 17 C.F.R. 
§ 205.3 states:  
If an attorney, appearing and practicing before the Commission in the representation of an issuer, 
becomes aware of evidence of a material violation by the issuer or by any officer, director, 
employee, or agent of the issuer, the attorney shall report such evidence to the issuer's chief legal 
officer (or the equivalent thereof) or to both the issuer's chief legal officer and its chief executive 
officer (or the equivalents thereof) forthwith.  
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We formulate two mutually exclusive hypotheses to characterize corporate counsels’ lack of 
actions in stopping corporate wrongdoing.  The first hypothesis is that fraudulent top-level 
executives intentionally keep the corporate counsels out of the information loop.  As a result, in-
house lawyers are generally unaware of the developing violations and therefore unable to report 
and prevent fraud.  Thus, the corporate counsels cannot fulfil their gatekeeping role since they 
simply do not have the information about the potential wrongdoings.    
A second hypothesis is that in-house corporate counsels are actually present at the scene of 
the crime.  They participate in planning, creation, execution or cover-up of the fraud alongside 
other top management.  This hypothesis states that corporate counsels are well aware of the fraud.   
In this case, corporate lawyers would have no incentive to report the fraud since they would be 
turning themselves in by reporting.  
Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that general counsels are aware of the corporate 
wrongdoing.  Insider trading behavior of GCs is similar to other top-level executives.  General 
counsels are heavy sellers of their own firm’s stocks during the Class periods and they profit 
abnormally by avoiding the stock price declines upon revelation of the fraud at the end of the class 
periods.  Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the GCs are part of the fraudulent 
group and therefore they should be treated the same.   
 
                                                          






























is between $1 




is more than 
$5 Billion   
Market 
Capitalization  




is between $1 




is more than 
$5 Billion   
Panel A: All Firms Purchases Sales   
                  
Number of Firms 17,187 1,712 496 19,395 16,250 1,765 518 18,533 
          
Number of Trades 775,659 88,756 30,208 894,623 1,409,700 820,335 632,318 2,862,353 
          
Average Trade Size 12,533.57 13,464.28 15,398.24 12,722.64 11,320.29 12,273.79 15,190.64 12,448.55 
          
Total Trades by Officers and Directors 
(Mill.) 7,411.75 862.87 333.95 8,608.57 10,418.73 6,956.10 1,313.73 18,688.55 
          
Total Trades by Top Executives (Mill.) 2,296.03 330.34 130.56 2,756.93 5,460.95 3,005.00 1,101.62 9,567.57 
          
Total Trades by General Counsel 
(Mill.) 14.00 1.82 0.64 16.46 78.53 105.55 1,219.77 1,403.85 
          































is between $1 












is between $1 




is more than 
$5 Billion
Panel A: All Firms
Number of Firms 21                 46                49               116            28 50                53                131            
Length of Class Period (days) 531               642              604              606            456 618               580              568            
Average Settlement ($Mill.) 63.50$           108.49$        279.70$       172.66$      88.44$         111.56$        277.67$        173.82$      
Number of Insider Trades 1,023             999              990              3,012          2,830           14,032          14,842          31,704        
Average Insider Trade Size 17,023.60      25,352.75      49,750.62     30,543.05   10,523.06    10,666.05      32,489.85     20,869.94   
Total Trades by Officers and Directors (Mill.) 12.88 16.73 37.14 66.76         18.76          95.80            250.60         365.16        
Total Trades by Top Executives (Mill.) 4.46 8.58 12.07 25.10         10.83          53.21            227.33         291.38        
Total Trades by General Counsel (Mill.) 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.13           0.19            0.65              4.28             5.13           
Total Shares Traded (Mill.) 17.42            25.33            49.25           92.00         29.78          149.67          482.21         661.66        




















Capitalization  is 
less than $1 Billion
Market 
Capitalization  
is between $1 












is between $1 




is more than 
$5 Billion
Panel A: All Firms
Number of Firms 11                        33               32               76              16               41               45               102          
Number of Trades 108                      236              308             652            898             4,381           4,957          10,236      
Average Trade Size 10,776.94              24,570.85     4,421.86      12,767.73    7,539.70      16,057.02     27,942.83    21,065.75 
Total Trades by Officers and Directors (Mill.) 0.56                     5.43             0.72            6.71           3.15            46.66           51.56          101.37     
Total Trades by Top Executives (Mill.) 0.60 0.37             0.62            1.59           3.49            23.34           86.12          112.95     
Total Trades by General Counsel (Mill.) 0.01                     -              0.02            0.02           0.13            0.34             0.83            1.31         
Total Shares Traded (Mill.) 1.16                     5.80             1.36            8.32           6.77            70.35           138.51        215.63     
Table 1B























Capitalization  is 
less than $1 Billion
Market 
Capitalization  
is between $1 












is between $1 




is more than 
$5 Billion
Panel A: All Firms
Number of Firms 16                        39               37               92              19               44               48               111          
Number of Trades 125                      415              345             885            478             8,214           7,833          16,525      
Average Trade Size 33,158.52              20,402.35     67,004.88    40,371.16    13,291.26    5,575.29       38,105.98    21,218.32 
Total Trades by Officers and Directors (Mill.) 1.76                     0.71             20.60          23.07          4.90            31.10           183.46        219.46     
Total Trades by Top Executives (Mill.) 2.36                     7.76             2.51            12.63          1.44            14.42           112.80        128.66     
Total Trades by General Counsel (Mill.) 0.03                     0.00             0.00            0.03           0.01            0.27             2.23            2.51         
Total Shares Traded (Mill.) 4.14                     8.47             23.12          35.73          6.35            45.80           298.48        350.63     
Table 1C






















Capitalization  is 
less than $1 Billion
Market 
Capitalization  
is between $1 












is between $1 




is more than 
$5 Billion
Panel A: All Firms
Number of Firms 14                        29               39               82              10               31               41               82            
Number of Trades 790                      348              337             1,475          1,441          1,437           2,052          4,930       
Average Trade Size 15,324.58              31,786.50     73,514.84    32,503.47    11,558.90    23,329.73     22,035.84    19,350.65 
Total Trades by Officers and Directors (Mill.) 10.56                    10.60           15.82          36.98          10.71          18.04           15.58          44.32       
Total Trades by Top Executives (Mill.) 1.50                     0.45             8.94            10.88          5.91            15.45           28.41          49.77       
Total Trades by General Counsel (Mill.) 0.05                     0.01             0.02            0.08           0.04            0.03             1.22            1.30         
Total Shares Traded (Mill.) 12.11                    11.06           24.77          47.94          16.66          33.52           45.22          95.40       
Purchases Sales
Table 1D




Insiders' Abnormal Profits in non SCA Firms between 1996 and 2014. 
 
Number of 
Observations 10-days 20-days 50-days 100-days 150-days 200-days 250-days 
All Officers 2,310,029 0.59% 0.84% 1.63% 2.43% 2.85% 3.36% 4.05% 
  (5.78) (5.86) (7.18) (7.52) (7.17) (7.31) (7.88) 
Top Executives 1,237,428 0.74% 1.09% 1.92% 3.04% 4.08% 4.69% 5.59% 
  (6.49) (6.71) (7.48) (8.36) (9.14) (9.08) (9.68) 
General Counsel 63,530 0.49% 0.73% 1.58% 2.42% 2.80% 3.31% 3.58% 
  (2.40) (2.52) (3.43) (3.73) (3.51) (3.59) (3.47) 





Insiders' Abnormal Profits in Firms Subject to Securities Fraud Lawsuits that Resulted in Settlements Exceeding $25 Million, 1996 - 2014. 
 
Number of 
Observations 10-days 20-days 50-days 100-days 150-days 200-days 250-days 
Officers-Before Class Period 6,741 0.72% 0.49% 0.02% -1.67% -1.31% -2.27% -1.45% 
  (1.04) (0.49) (0.01) (-0.76) (-0.49) (-0.73) (-0.42) 
Officers-During Class Period 9,466 1.51% 2.29% 4.65% 8.57% 15.99% 24.27% 29.42% 
  (2.50) (2.68) (3.44) (4.50) (6.84) (8.98) (9.75) 
Officers-After Class Period 3,846 2.39% 0.77% 0.19% 0.46% 8.20% 22.23% 28.39% 
  (2.19) (0.50) (0.08) (0.13) (1.95) (4.54) (5.18) 
Top Executives-Before Class Period 3,887 0.08% -0.78% -0.47% -0.01% 1.97% -1.65% 2.33% 
  (0.09) (-0.62) (-0.24) (-0.00) (0.57) (-0.41) (0.52) 
Top Executives-During Class Period 6,644 2.15% 4.48% 7.58% 10.14% 16.95% 20.69% 21.90% 
  (2.12) (3.14) (3.36) (3.17) (4.33) (4.58) (4.33) 
Top Executives-After Class Period 2,490 2.68% 1.91% 4.90% 15.35% 21.84% 30.77% 41.68% 
  (5.82) (2.93) (4.80) (10.52) (12.28) (14.98) (18.07) 
General Counsels-Before Class Period 260 -0.22% 0.20% -2.21% -6.20% -17.50% -22.85% -22.53% 
  (-0.11) (0.07) (-0.49) (-0.98) (-2.25) (-2.55) (-2.25) 
General Counsels-During Class Period 1,300 -0.94% -0.86% 0.70% 4.44% 6.45% 13.51% 17.74% 
  (-0.61) (-0.40) (0.20) (0.91) (1.08) (1.97) (2.31) 
General Counsels-After Class Period 69 3.87% 4.82% 7.30% 4.18% 11.39% 10.35% 6.96% 
  (2.55) (2.25) (2.15) (0.87) (1.94) (1.52) (0.92) 









Observations 10-days 20-days 50-days 100-days 150-days 200-days 250-days 
Officers-Before Class Period 558 0.18% 0.54% -0.40% -2.39% 0.65% 0.72% -1.80% 
  (0.21) (0.45) (-0.21) (-0.89) (0.20) (0.19) (-0.43) 
Officers-During Class Period 559 0.89% 2.07% -4.25% -15.90% -25.78% -31.61% -36.95% 
  (0.71) (1.17) (-1.52) (-4.01) (-5.31) (-5.64) (-5.89) 
Officers-After Class Period 1,287 4.31% -1.00% -2.06% -13.81% -2.67% 32.93% 44.28% 
  (1.42) (-0.23) (-0.30) (-1.46) (-0.23) (2.43) (2.93) 
Top Executives-Before Class Period 85 3.66% 4.27% 7.35% 7.33% 13.30% 12.31% 8.39% 
  (1.59) (1.31) (1.42) (1.00) (1.49) (1.19) (0.73) 
Top Executives-During Class Period 311 5.97% 4.62% -2.91% -30.30% -45.74% -61.41% -53.99% 
  (2.74) (1.49) (-0.59) (-4.36) (-5.39) (-6.31) (-4.91) 
Top Executives-After Class Period 171 3.94% 6.04% 12.21% 14.70% 13.73% 17.55% 11.11% 
  (2.39) (2.59) (3.32) (2.82) (2.15) (2.38) (1.34) 
General Counsels-Before Class Period 9 20.86% 20.59% 31.90% 27.99% 44.19% 67.72% 70.83% 
  (3.10) (2.16) (2.11) (1.31) (1.69) (2.24) (2.10) 
General Counsels-During Class Period 15 1.96% 11.53% -4.94% -24.85% -35.25% -66.16% -89.62% 
  (0.45) (1.89) (-0.51) (-1.81) (-2.10) (-3.40) (-4.12) 
General Counsels-After Class Period 17 18.25% 20.12% 24.22% 18.93% 35.98% 28.38% 12.79% 
  (3.58) (2.78) (2.11) (1.17) (1.81) (1.24) (0.50) 









Observations 10-days 20-days 50-days 100-days 150-days 200-days 250-days 
All Officers-Before Class Period 6,183 0.77% 0.48% 0.06% -1.60% -1.49% -2.54% -1.42% 
  (1.03) (0.45) (0.03) (-0.67) (-0.51) (-0.76) (-0.38) 
All Officers-During Class Period 8,907 1.55% 2.30% 5.20% 10.11% 18.61% 27.78% 33.59% 
  (2.44) (2.56) (3.67) (5.05) (7.57) (9.78) (10.58) 
All Officers-After Class Period 2,559 1.43% 1.66% 1.32% 7.64% 13.67% 16.85% 20.39% 
  (2.09) (1.72) (0.86) (3.54) (5.17) (5.52) (5.98) 
Top Executives-Before Class Period 3,802 -0.00% -0.89% -0.64% -0.17% 1.71% -1.96% 2.20% 
  (-0.00) (-0.70) (-0.32) (-0.06) (0.49) (-0.49) (0.49) 
Top Executives-During Class Period 6,333 1.96% 4.48% 8.10% 12.13% 20.03% 24.72% 25.63% 
  (1.86) (3.00) (3.44) (3.63) (4.91) (5.25) (4.86) 
Top Executives-After Class Period 2,319 2.58% 1.60% 4.37% 15.40% 22.43% 31.74% 43.93% 
  (5.41) (2.38) (4.14) (10.20) (12.20) (14.96) (18.37) 
General Counsels-Before Class Period 251 -0.98% -0.53% -3.43% -7.42% -19.72% -26.10% -25.88% 
  (-0.48) (-0.18) (-0.75) (-1.15) (-2.49) (-2.86) (-2.53) 
General Counsels-During Class Period 1,285 -0.97% -1.01% 0.77% 4.78% 6.94% 14.44% 19.00% 
  (-0.63) (-0.46) (0.22) (0.97) (1.15) (2.08) (2.45) 
General Counsels-After Class Period 52 -0.83% -0.18% 1.77% -0.65% 3.35% 4.46% 5.06% 
  (-0.58) (-0.09) (0.55) (-0.14) (0.60) (0.69) (0.70) 




Insiders' Abnormal Profits in Firms Subject to Securities Fraud Lawsuits that Resulted in Settlements Exceeding $25 Million 1996 - 2014.  
Panel 1: Shares Traded less than 1,000 Only 
 
Number of 
Observations 10-days 20-days 50-days 100-days 150-days 200-days 250-days 
All Officers-Before Class Period 2,526 1.62% 1.81% 0.22% -2.62% -1.92% -3.80% -3.44% 
  (1.02) (0.81) (0.06) (-0.52) (-0.31) (-0.54) (-0.43) 
All Officers-During Class Period 3,967 1.66% 1.86% 5.23% 8.93% 17.92% 31.01% 36.46% 
  (1.51) (1.19) (2.12) (2.57) (4.20) (6.28) (6.61) 
All Officers-After Class Period 1,137 0.66% -1.57% -2.92% -3.15% 6.42% 20.47% 25.03% 
  (0.53) (-0.90) (-1.07) (-0.82) (1.35) (3.71) (4.06) 
Panel 2: Shares Traded between 1,000 and 10,000 Only 
All Officers-Before Class Period 4,215 0.18% -0.31% -0.10% -1.10% -0.95% -1.36% -0.26% 
  (0.38) (-0.46) (-0.09) (-0.73) (-0.51) (-0.64) (-0.11) 
All Officers-During Class Period 5,499 1.40% 2.60% 4.22% 8.31% 14.60% 19.41% 24.34% 
  (3.27) (4.30) (4.41) (6.14) (8.79) (10.12) (11.36) 
All Officers-After Class Period 2,709 3.12% 1.75% 1.49% 1.97% 8.95% 22.97% 29.80% 
  (2.68) (1.06) (0.57) (0.54) (2.00) (4.41) (5.12) 
Panel 3: Shares Traded greater 10,000 Only 
All Officers-Before Class Period 1,394 -0.40% -1.12% -2.04% -4.58% -5.35% -4.45% -2.08% 
  (-0.62) (-1.21) (-1.39) (-2.22) (-2.12) (-1.53) (-0.64) 
All Officers-During Class Period 1,604 1.35% 3.24% 6.44% 9.27% 15.94% 20.78% 27.16% 
  (2.99) (5.08) (6.38) (6.50) (9.11) (10.29) (12.03) 
All Officers-After Class Period 843 6.30% 5.39% 4.33% 2.78% 7.64% 17.16% 22.18% 
  (3.99) (2.40) (1.22) (0.55) (1.24) (2.41) (2.79) 




Insiders' Abnormal Profits in Firms Subject to Securities Fraud Lawsuits that Resulted in Settlements Exceeding $25 Million 1996 - 2014.  
Panel 1: Shares Traded less than 1,000 Only. 
 
Number of 
Observations 10-days 20-days 50-days 100-days 150-days 200-days 250-days 
Top Executives-Before Class Period 1,153 0.16% 0.71% -0.92% -1.44% 0.79% -3.67% -0.21% 
  (0.09) (0.28) (-0.23) (-0.26) (0.11) (-0.46) (-0.02) 
Top Executives-During Class Period 3,170 1.56% 4.79% 9.77% 11.06% 15.09% 16.52% 16.26% 
  (1.00) (2.18) (2.81) (2.25) (2.50) (2.37) (2.09) 
Top Executives-After Class Period 834 1.34% 0.91% 3.83% 18.37% 27.44% 40.90% 55.69% 
  (1.54) (0.75) (2.00) (6.71) (8.21) (10.57) (12.84) 
Panel 2: Shares Traded between 1,000 and 10,000 Only. 
Top Executives-Before Class Period 2,734 0.05% -1.41% -0.28% 0.60% 2.46% -0.79% 3.40% 
  (0.06) (-1.36) (-0.17) (0.26) (0.86) (-0.24) (0.93) 
Top Executives-During Class Period 3,474 2.68% 4.20% 5.59% 9.30% 18.66% 24.49% 27.05% 
  (3.39) (3.76) (3.15) (3.71) (6.08) (6.92) (6.83) 
Top Executives-After Class Period 1,656 3.35% 2.41% 5.44% 13.83% 19.02% 25.67% 34.63% 
  (6.38) (3.22) (4.60) (8.25) (9.28) (10.86) (13.08) 
Panel 3: Shares Traded greater than 10,000 Only. 
Top Executives-Before Class Period 870 0.39% -0.65% -0.88% -2.80% -2.73% -1.55% 3.43% 
  (0.65) (-0.76) (-0.65) (-1.46) (-1.16) (-0.58) (1.13) 
Top Executives-During Class Period 1,227 3.38% 5.14% 8.76% 13.02% 24.53% 30.62% 35.05% 
  (4.82) (5.18) (5.57) (5.84) (9.01) (9.74) (9.95) 
Top Executives-After Class Period 520 4.61% 3.20% 7.14% 14.58% 10.23% 8.94% 13.80% 
  (5.18) (2.51) (3.55) (5.16) (2.93) (2.22) (3.06) 




Insiders' Abnormal Profits in Firms Subject to Securities Fraud Lawsuits that Resulted in Settlements Exceeding $25 Million 1996 - 2014.  
Panel 1: Shares Traded less than 1,000 Only. 
 
Number of 
Observations 10-days 20-days 50-days 100-days 150-days 200-days 250-days 
General Counsels-Before Class Period 100 0.40% 1.81% 1.34% -6.47% -19.99% -25.90% -26.26% 
  (0.17) (0.55) (0.26) (-0.88) (-2.22) (-2.49) (-2.26) 
General Counsels-During Class Period 894 -2.23% -2.47% 0.70% 2.25% 1.57% 8.83% 11.58% 
  (-1.08) (-0.85) (0.15) (0.34) (0.20) (0.96) (1.12) 
General Counsels-After Class Period 7 4.75% 4.06% 6.10% 12.19% 17.95% 10.13% 9.65% 
  (1.42) (0.86) (0.82) (1.15) (1.39) (0.68) (0.58) 
Panel 2: Shares Traded between 1,000 and 10,000 Only. 
General Counsels-Before Class Period 160 -0.61% -0.81% -4.42% -6.03% -15.95% -20.95% -20.20% 
  (-0.30) (-0.28) (-0.99) (-0.95) (-2.06) (-2.34) (-2.02) 
General Counsels-During Class Period 406 1.92% 2.69% 0.71% 9.25% 17.19% 23.82% 31.32% 
  (2.09) (2.07) (0.35) (3.19) (4.83) (5.80) (6.82) 
General Counsels-After Class Period 62 3.77% 4.90% 7.44% 3.27% 10.65% 10.37% 6.66% 
  (2.34) (2.15) (2.06) (0.64) (1.70) (1.44) (0.82) 
Panel 3: Shares Traded greater than 10,000 Only. 
General Counsels-Before Class Period 29 -0.14% 1.33% -0.32% 1.88% 2.66% 5.89% 8.47% 
  (-0.09) (0.58) (-0.09) (0.37) (0.42) (0.81) (1.05) 
General Counsels-During Class Period 28 -0.79% -2.31% 2.97% 12.87% 17.09% 18.06% 26.30% 
  (-0.51) (-1.06) (0.86) (2.63) (2.85) (2.61) (3.40) 
General Counsels-After Class Period 26 -2.84% -3.55% 1.26% -0.06% 5.13% 12.45% 15.47% 
  (-1.52) (-1.34) (0.30) (-0.01) (0.71) (1.48) (1.65) 






Insiders' Abnormal Profits in Firms Subject to Securities Fraud Lawsuits that Resulted in Settlements Exceeding $25 Million 1996 - 2014.  
Pre-Sox Period Only 
 
Number of 
Observations 10-days 20-days 50-days 100-days 150-days 200-days 250-days 
All Officers-Before Class Period 3,094 0.43% -0.57% -0.50% -0.57% 0.10% -0.59% 0.75% 
  (0.58) (-0.55) (-0.30) (-0.24) (0.04) (-0.18) (0.20) 
All Officers-During Class Period 1,885 2.64% 5.64% 9.09% 12.11% 19.80% 24.92% 31.41% 
  (4.26) (6.48) (6.56) (6.16) (8.23) (8.96) (10.11) 
All Officers-After Class Period 800 10.05% 7.28% 1.15% -9.70% -0.71% 37.50% 52.55% 
  (2.85) (1.45) (0.14) (-0.87) (-0.05) (2.37) (2.97) 
Top Executives-Before Class Period 1,642 -0.35% -1.60% 0.29% 3.71% 11.09% 9.09% 12.49% 
  (-0.33) (-1.08) (0.12) (1.12) (2.73) (1.93) (2.38) 
Top Executives-During Class Period 975 3.64% 6.65% 9.62% 14.72% 27.73% 35.07% 45.49% 
  (4.01) (5.19) (4.73) (5.13) (7.87) (8.62) (10.01) 
Top Executives-After Class Period 529 2.35% 1.08% -1.52% 7.94% 23.33% 30.33% 37.67% 
  (1.52) (0.49) (-0.44) (1.63) (3.89) (4.38) (4.87) 
General Counsels-Before Class Period 31 5.50% 6.36% 10.80% 12.36% 23.50% 38.70% 49.74% 
  (2.26) (1.84) (1.98) (1.60) (2.49) (3.54) (4.08) 
General Counsels-During Class Period 233 2.87% 4.92% 1.20% 9.61% 12.87% 21.55% 22.72% 
  (3.48) (4.24) (0.65) (3.68) (4.02) (5.85) (5.51) 
General Counsels-After Class Period 21 9.04% 11.06% 30.15% 25.10% 36.62% 34.46% 23.79% 
  (2.45) (2.11) (3.67) (2.15) (2.56) (2.08) (1.28) 




Insiders' Abnormal Profits in Firms Subject to Securities Fraud Lawsuits that Resulted in Settlements Exceeding $25 Million 1996 - 2014. 
Post-SOX Period Only. 
 
Number of 
Observations 10-days 20-days 50-days 100-days 150-days 200-days 250-days 
All Officers-Before Class Period 3,647 0.97% 1.38% 0.46% -2.60% -2.51% -3.70% -3.32% 
  (0.85) (0.86) (0.18) (-0.72) (-0.57) (-0.73) (-0.58) 
All Officers-During Class Period 7,581 1.23% 1.46% 3.54% 7.69% 15.04% 24.11% 28.93% 
  (1.67) (1.40) (2.15) (3.30) (5.26) (7.30) (7.84) 
All Officers-After Class Period 3,046 0.38% -0.94% -0.06% 3.13% 10.54% 18.22% 22.04% 
  (0.38) (-0.67) (-0.03) (1.00) (2.73) (4.09) (4.43) 
Top Executives-Before Class Period 2,245 0.39% -0.18% -1.02% -2.72% -4.70% -9.50% -5.10% 
  (0.29) (-0.09) (-0.34) (-0.64) (-0.90) (-1.58) (-0.76) 
Top Executives-During Class Period 5,669 1.89% 4.11% 7.23% 9.35% 15.10% 18.22% 17.84% 
  (1.61) (2.48) (2.76) (2.52) (3.33) (3.48) (3.05) 
Top Executives-After Class Period 1,961 2.76% 2.13% 6.64% 17.35% 21.43% 30.89% 42.76% 
  (3.99) (2.17) (4.28) (7.90) (8.01) (9.99) (12.33) 
General Counsels-Before Class Period 229 -0.99% -0.64% -3.97% -8.71% -23.05% -31.18% -32.31% 
  (-0.45) (-0.20) (-0.80) (-1.24) (-2.67) (-3.13) (-2.90) 
General Counsels-During Class Period 1,067 -1.77% -2.12% 0.59% 3.31% 5.05% 11.76% 16.66% 
  (-0.94) (-0.80) (0.14) (0.56) (0.70) (1.40) (1.78) 
General Counsels-After Class Period 48 1.61% 2.09% -2.70% -4.98% 0.35% -0.20% -0.40% 
  (1.09) (1.01) (-0.82) (-1.07) (0.06) (-0.03) (-0.05) 





Insiders' Abnormal Profits in Firms Subject to Securities Fraud Lawsuits that Resulted in Settlements 1996 - 2014.   
Settlements Between $3 Million and $25 Million 
 
Number of 
Observations 10-days 20-days 50-days 100-days 150-days 200-days 250-days 
All Officers-Before Class Period 7,665 -0.50% -1.00% -2.90% -1.57% 2.89% 7.33% 16.72% 
  (-0.69) (-0.98) (-1.82) (-0.69) (1.04) (2.29) (4.62) 
All Officers-During Class Period 9,154 2.65% 5.64% 9.79% 17.35% 24.55% 27.85% 33.90% 
  (4.16) (6.29) (6.88) (8.63) (9.98) (9.76) (10.63) 
All Officers-After Class Period 4,970 2.03% 0.46% 0.10% -0.11% 2.94% 12.82% 18.37% 
  (1.96) (0.32) (0.04) (-0.03) (0.74) (2.76) (3.54) 
Top Executives-Before Class Period 4,937 1.07% -0.44% -2.09% -0.66% 1.44% 7.16% 9.32% 
  (0.69) (-0.20) (-0.60) (-0.14) (0.24) (1.03) (1.20) 
Top Executives-During Class Period 6,493 2.03% 4.18% 10.22% 17.57% 21.02% 28.01% 33.60% 
  (2.89) (4.20) (6.51) (7.91) (7.70) (8.89) (9.54) 
Top Executives-After Class Period 3,006 0.48% 2.39% 4.03% 5.15% 7.42% 12.70% 11.97% 
  (0.37) (1.29) (1.38) (1.24) (1.46) (2.17) (1.83) 
General Counsels-Before Class Period 460 4.97% 1.18% 8.93% 25.38% 30.58% 24.89% 32.09% 
  (1.00) (0.17) (0.80) (1.61) (1.58) (1.12) (1.29) 
General Counsels-During Class Period 186 2.49% 7.96% 6.37% 19.80% 25.08% 24.82% 25.31% 
  (1.34) (3.04) (1.54) (3.38) (3.50) (2.99) (2.73) 
General Counsels-After Class Period 148 2.38% 2.10% -3.04% 8.63% 11.06% 9.61% 3.62% 
  (0.81) (0.51) (-0.46) (0.93) (0.98) (0.73) (0.25) 




























Event Day Relative to Insider Trading Day (0)
Figure 1:  Profitability of Insider Trading in SCA-Settled Firms during 
the pre-Class Period 
























Event Day Relative to Insider Trading Day (0)
Figure 2:  Profitability of Insider Trading in SCA-Settled Firms during 
the Class Period 






















Event Day Relative to Insider Trading Day (0)
Figure 3:  Profitability of Insider Trading in SCA-Settled Firms during 
the post-Class Period 
Officers and Directors Top Executives General Counsels
